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Introduction
Key exchange protocol is able to make the two sides of communication generate a common session key so that users can communicate with each other in insecure channel safely. 2010 , paper [1] presented a password-based key exchange protocol, which can resist server key disclosure attack , dictionary attack, however the protocol uses the public key of the server, so excessive consumption of calculation is generated. Paper [2] presented a verifier-based key exchange protocol for three-party, but the protocol is vulnerable to server key disclosure attack.2011 paper [3] presented a efficient 3pake, but we point out the protocol cannot resist impersonation attack subsequently, and presented a improved protocol [4] . However, this improved protocol sill cannot resist off-line dictionary attack and server key disclosure attack. So on the basis of the previous works, this paper will present a new three-party key exchange protocol which can be proved to be safe and efficient. And the new three-party key exchange protocol can be expanded into a crossrealm key exchange protocol, different from the existing c2c-pake [5] [6] [7] , the new c2c-pake uses hash algorithm instead of symmetric and asymmetric encryption, and can make two users from different realms generate a common session key in only 3 rounds.
Analysis of protocol in paper [4]
Review of protocol in paper [4] PWA,PWB are the passwords of user A,B respectively, assume A wants to communicate with B, the process of protocol is as follow:
Step Similarly, If E gets message Z S which S sends to B , E can also get password of B through offline dictionary attack.
(2)Sever key disclosure attack. Almost all the password-based key exchange protocol is vulnerable to sever key disclosure attack, in this protocol , if adversary E gets the password of user C, E can pose as C to communicate with others, or pose as other user and server to communicate with C easily. 3pake based on private key
Description of protocol
First, all the parameters of the protocol will be introduced briefly: S: a trusted third server; A,B: Two users; PW A : password of user A, stored on A and server S; PW B : password of user B, stored on B and server S; s A : long-term private key of user A; s B : long-term private key of user B; s server : long-term private key of server S; s A P , s B P , s server P: three open parameters, P is the generating element of finite cyclic additive group G, which's order is q; Assume user A wants to initiate a conversation with user B, the process of the protocol is as follows: included by S will fail ; If E attempts to pose as server S and user B to communicate with A, he cannot pass the validation in round 3 because private key sserver of server S is unknown. Another situation, if E gets the password PWB of session responder B, he can also not pose as B or other users to communicate, because both the private key sB and sserver are unknown for E.
(3) Forward security. Because each session key consists of random number, and Diffie-Hellman problem is hard, even if password and private key of user is got by adversary E, previous session key and communication content is sill safe. So the protocol has forward security.
(4)Replay attack. Because there is fresh identifier t, it is hard for adversary to impact the operation of protocol through sending the old messages. 
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Obviously, user C cannot pose as session initiator A to communicate. Similarly, C also can not pose as the session responder B to communicate. So the protocol can resist the insider attack. Table 1 we can see that the new protocol is more efficient than protocol of [3] , compared with the protocol of [4] , the new 3pake is almost the same in efficiency, but the safety performance has been enhanced.
The c2c-pake presented by this paper

Description of protocol
A,B: two users from different realms; SA: a trusted third server in the realm of user A; SB: a trusted third server in the realm of user B; PWA: password of user A, stored on A and server SA; PWB: password of user B, stored on B and server SB; sA1, sA2: two long-term private keys of user A; sB1, sB2: two long-term private keys of user B; sserverA1, sserverA2,: two long-term private keys of server SA; sserverB1, sserverB2,: two long-term private keys of server SB; sA1P , sA2P ,sB1P , sB2P ,sserverA1P, sserverA2P, sserverB1P, sserverB2P: several open parameters;
Assume user A wants to communicate with B, the process of protocol is as follows: 
Safety analysis
(1) Off-line dictionary attack. The offline dictionary is infeasible because all of the message transmitted have more than two unknown parameters for adversary.
(2) The insider attack. Assume adversary gets password and private key of user C, he attempts to pose as A to initiate a session, E calculates ge, . If E wants to pose as B to communicate with other user as a responder, also cannot pass the validation included by SB.
(3) Sever key disclosure attack.
If adversary E gets password PWA of session initiator A, E attempts to pose as A to communicate with other user, E cannot pass the validation included by SA in round 2, because the private key sA1 is unknown for E; If E wants to pose as session responder B and SB to respond A, the private key sserverB1, sserverB2 is unknown for E, which makes the validation included by A fail. In another way , when E gets password PWB of session responder B , if E attempts to pose as B to respond other user, validation Several temporary random numbers are add into the calculation of the session key, in addition ,there is intractability of the Diffie-Hellman problem, so even if adversary gets the password and private key of user , previous communication content is still unknown for the adversary.
(6) Impersonation attack. Adversary E cannot pose as the session initiator A to communicate because both the password and private key of A are unknown for E; Similarly, E also cannot pose as the session responder B to respond the session. Table 2 we can see that the c2c-pake presented by this paper has no use for asymmetric or symmetric encryption, and can generates a common session key in only three rounds, so the new protocol is more efficient.
Summary
This paper introduces private keys of server and user into 3pake, and presents a improved protocol on the basis of a existing one. The new protocol is almost as same as the old one in efficiency, but the safety has been improved greatly. And on the basis of the new 3pake, an efficient c2c-pake without asymmetric or symmetric encryption is presented, and it is proved that the c2c-pake can resist all kinds of common attacks. In future work, we will further improve the efficiency of protocols, and plan to reduce the round number of cross-realm key exchange protocol.
